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Rachel Cheng
IIP Paper
Hungary’s (Soon to be) New Administrative Courts
I. Introduction
While Hungary has been touted as an example of successful transition from
authoritarian communist regime to constitutional democracy, the rise of Fidesz
power and re-elections of Prime Minister Victor Orbán have cast serious doubts on
the strength and continuity of Hungary’s democratic institutions. As Prime Minister
elected in 1998, reelected in 2010, and for a third term in 2018, Orbán and the
Fidesz party have been able to rewrite the constitution by parliamentary vote,
wielding the two-thirds majority needed under Hungarian constitutional law.1 The
political sphere of Hungary currently operates much like an authoritarian
government, with controls on media, commerce, and election propaganda, making it
difficult if not impossible for any credible opponent of Orbán to successfully run
against him.
In December 2018, the Fidesz government passed a law to create a separate
administrative court system.2 Set to begin operations in January 2020, these new
administrative courts will handle all cases arising from administrative law

Viktor Orban: Hungary PM re-elected for third term, BBC News,
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-43693663
2 Lydia Gall, Hungary’s Latest Assault on the Judiciary, Human Rights Watch,
https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/12/14/hungarys-latest-assault-judiciary
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questions, including important issues such as elections, asylum, assembly,
corruption, antitrust and police violence.3 This is of primary concern because the
newly proposed administrative courts will be filled by the Justice Minister, who
operates under Orbán. The Justice Minister will also have the power over the
court’s budget as well as over judicial promotions.4 Although publicly the
government notes this change was motivated by “efficiency,” human rights
organizations have charged the government with seriously jeopardizing judicial
independence and the separation of powers.5
This paper will examine the threat to the independence of the judiciary in
Hungary, focusing in particular on the proposed new administrative courts and its
relationship to the Couria6 and the Constitutional Court. The paper will discuss the
court system in Hungary, recent attempts at Hungarian judicial reform, and the
law on administrative courts. The apper will also address concerns with the new
system as expressed by a current sitting judge in the Couria. The paper will
conclude with the Venice Commission’s recent opinion issued evaluating the new
law, and discuss its recommendations for change, and conflicting overall acceptance
of the new legal regime.

Id.; see also Teodora Miljojkovic, Hungary Establishes new administrative court system, Jurist,
https://www.jurist.org/news/2018/12/hungary-expands-executive-branchs-control-of-its-judicialsystem/
4 Miljojkovic, supra note 3.
5 Id.
6 The Supreme Court of Hungary is also known as the Curia. These terms will be used
interchangeably throughout.
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II. Court System in Hungary: Constitutional Courts vs. Court of Hungary
The court system in Hungary operates under the principles of the Hungarian
Constitution, also known as the Fundamental Law of Hungary. The Fundamental
Law espouses the virtue of the distribution of powers, issuing to the courts the task
of dispensing justice.7 The Fundamental Law entered into force January 1, 2012,
replacing the constitution written in 2004, which took Hungary from communism
into democracy.8 There are four tiers in the system: district courts, administrative
and labor courts, regional courts, regional courts of appeal and the Curia, which is
the main judicial body, also called the Supreme Court of Hungary.9 Interestingly,
however, the hierarchy does not indicate subordination between the levels—judges
occupying positions “higher” in the hierarchy do not have the right to issue
instruction to other judges or courts.10
Since Hungary operates on a civil law, rather than a common law, system,
judges are tasked with independently rendering their decisions given their own
beliefs about the case and the applicable laws.11 There are 91 judges in the Curia.12
They are tasked with making decisions on appeals filed from the Regional Courts
and the Regional Court of Appeal, as well as publishing guidance documents.

Judicial System, Courts of Hungary, https://birosag.hu/en/judicial-system
See Catherine Dupre, Hungary’s Fundamental Law Challenges the EU’s Democratic Ideals,
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/libertycentral/2012/mar/13/hungary-fundamental-laweu
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 See id.
12 About the Hungarian Legal System, The Constitutional Court, https://hunconcourt.hu/about-thehungarian-legal-system/
7
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Within the Curia, there are three departments: criminal, civil, and administrativelabor. Unlike Article III judges in the U.S., judges in the Curia hear cases only on
limited areas of law. Examples of cases handled by the administrative-labor law
judges include cases on tax evasion, employment equality, refugee status, drunk
driving and license removal, antitrust, product safety and medicines.13 Evidently,
adjudication in this field is expansive across many substantive areas of law and
touching on important rights issues.
The Constitutional Court of Hungary operates separately from this fourtiered court system. The Constitutional Court was established by the Fundamental
Law in 2011, is elected by Parliament, and reviews the constitutionality of laws.14 It
is also charged with protecting constitutional civil rights as well as the rights of
national and ethnic minorities.15 On its website, the Constitutional Court has a long
list of competencies, including ex ante review of conformity with the fundamental
law, ex post review of conformity with the fundamental law, constitutional
complaint, and interpretation of the fundamental law.
III. Recent History on Attempts at Hungarian Judicial Reform
To put the new law on administrative courts in context, it is necessary to
address the Fidesz party’s previous efforts to influence the composition of the
judiciary. Since it’s election in 2010, the Fidesz party has implemented major

Administrative and labour law cases, Kuria of Hungary, https://kuriabirosag.hu/en/administrative-and-labour-law-cases?page=1.
14 Government And SOicety: Constitutional Framework, Encyclopedia Britannica,
https://www.britannica.com/place/Hungary/Government-and-society
15 Id.
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changes to Hungary’s constitution and court system with its two-third majority in
Parliament.16 Among these changes included curbing the independence of the
judiciary through forcing sitting judges to retire by lowering the retirement age, and
creating limits on the kinds of complaints that the Constitutional Court may hear.17
While these measures significantly compromised judicial independence, the Venice
Commission and the European Commission intervened during the attempted
reforms to temper the drastic reforms that might otherwise have occurred in the
judiciary.18
In 2016, Fidesz proposed the idea of creating a separate system of
administrative courts.19 Although the government tried to accomplish this objective
through passing a statute, the Constitutional Court found the statute invalid
because the change required an amendment to the constitution.20 Because Fidesz at
the time did not have a two-thirds majority in Parliament, it could not legitimately
create this separate court system.21
According to Professor Renata Uitz, the new law is Fidesz’s second attempt to
accomplish a court-packing maneuver which was thwarted in 2011.22 While the
official explanation for the administrative courts law was that it was intended to

Wrong Direction on Rights, Human Rights Watch, https://www.hrw.org/report/2013/05/16/wrongdirection-rights/assessing-impact-hungarys-new-constitution-and-laws
17 See id.
18 Renata Uitz, An Advanced Course in Court Packing: Hungary’s New Law on Administrative
Courts, Verfassungblog, https://verfassungsblog.de/an-advanced-course-in-court-packing-hungarysnew-law-on-administrative-courts/
19 Id.
20 Id. President Ader also voiced his agreement with this position.
21 Id.
22 Id.
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enforce the Seventh Amendment of the Fundamental Law and align Hungary’s
constitutional regime with those of its European neighbors, the text of the law
suggests that this explanation is mere pretext. The new law essentially sidelines
the Curia as the Supreme Court of the land by creating a separate Supreme
Administrative Court running concurrent to the Curia.
IV. The Law on the Administrative Courts
On December 12, 2018, the Hungarian Parliament adopted, the Law on the
Administrative Courts.23 In spite of protests, the Law was passed and created a new
and independent regime of administrative courts, separate from the regular justice
system in which the Curia sits.24 These courts will be a self-standing branch of
administrative courts, “nominally within the Hungarian judiciary, yet, placed under
the direction of a separate newly established Supreme Administrative Court
alongside the existing Supreme Court (Kuria).”25 These courts would essentially
replace the administrative-labor courts currently in the Curia by moving
jurisdiction of all administrative matters to these new courts. Notably, the courts
will be situated in Esztergom, located in northern Hungary about 29 miles
northwest of Budapest.26

Hungary: ICJ Calls for Re-Consideration of the Law on the Administrative Courts, International
Commission of Jurists, https://www.icj.org/hungary-icj-calls-for-re-consideration-of-the-law-on-theadministrative-courts/
24 Csaba Kiss, What will the new Hungarian law on administrative courts bring for acess to justice?
Client Earth, https://www.clientearth.org/what-will-the-new-hungarian-law-on-administrativecourts-bring-for-access-to-justice/
25 Uitz, supra note 18.
26 Kiss, supra note 24.
23
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Eight days after its passage, the International Commission of Jurists called
on Hungarian President János Áder not to sign the Law. The Law was voted on
although the opinion of the Council of Europe Venice Commission was still
pending.27 By the text of the Law, the Minister of Justice will have power of
appointment of administrative judges, and the Minster of Justice and Parliament
will have control over the court’s annual budget as well.28 Although a newlyestablished National Administrative Judicial Council will be tasked with advising
the Minister of Justice on judicial appointments, the Minister has ultimate
discretion and can refuse to appoint the Council’s first choice nominee.29
As the Law currently stands, there are pressing concerns with its structure
and composition. While the Hungarian government expressed desire to comply with
the Venice Commission’s recommendations for change, the finalized version of the
law only complied with roughly one third of those recommendations.30 The serious
remaining concerns involved the expertise and independence of the judges from
political influence. While the new courts will need 300 judges, the President of the
Supreme Court has stated that only 120 currently sitting judges in the Curia will
move.31 This indicates that the remaining judges will be appointed by the Minister.
The consequence of this is that new judges, who may be politically motivated and

Id.
Id.
29 Id.
30 Hungary’s Laws on Administrative Courts Comply with Only 30% of Venice Commission
Recommendations, Hungarian Hensinki Committee, https://www.helsinki.hu/en/hungarys-laws-onadministrative-courts-comply-with-only-30-of-venice-commission-recommendations/
31 Id.
27
28
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have little or no judicial experience, will outnumber the former Curia judges who
are generally regarded as more independent and experienced.
For example, under the law, it is still possible that judges with no experience
can adjudicate cases. Under the law, there is no requirement of expertise for the
judges that will be appointed by the Minister of Justice, even for the chief
administrative judge, who would serve as the President of the Supreme
Administrative Court.32 Although the Venice Commission recommended a minimum
of five years of judicial experience for candidates for the Presidential position, it
does not appear that Hungarian Parliament will change this law to reflect this
concern.33
Further, since judges in these courts are expected to come from public
administration, there is a genuine concern with judicial independence and partisan
loyalty. One judge, who requested to be interviewed anonymously under the name
Gipsz, has stated that those coming from public administration are “socialized
differently.”34 The judge continued, explaining that those in the administration
“come from a system of subordination, [and] subjection, where the orders of the boss
cannot be challenged.”35 As such, judges that come from the administration pose a
risk of compromised independence, especially when deciding cases related to the

Id.
See id.
34 Benjamin Novak, “We are no longer bastions of the rule of law,” says Hungarian judge, The
Budapest Beacon, March 1, 2018, https://budapestbeacon.com/we-are-no-longer-bastions-of-the-ruleof-law-says-hungarian-judge/
35 Id.
32
33

8

government, state or other significant cases.36 This is particularly concerning
because cases pertinent to the government or state are precisely the kinds of cases
that need an independent judicial decision to uphold constitutional integrity. In a
time when the courts are effectively the only source of non-politicized accountability
left to keep the Fidesz-dominated executive and legislative powers in check,
changing the composition of the courts is a serious threat to Hungary’s continuing
legacy of constitutional democracy.
As Judge Gipsz notes, creating a separate system of administrative courts
will lead to the filtering of important cases to those courts:
If these separate courts are created and filled with judges who were
socialized in a setting where judicial independence is not of paramount
importance, it can easily happen that these courts will get the sensitive cases
because they can be expected to deliver appropriate rulings. I can say a few
examples: lawsuits involving freedom of information requests typically target
governmental decisions.37
V. Staffing the Administrative Court of Law: Concerns from the Current Curia
Bench
Judge Andras Kovas, an administrative law judge who specializes in
antitrust currently in the Curia, has stated that administrative law judges in his
position face a difficult decision in determining whether to move to the new

36
37

Id.
Id.
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administrative courts.38 All Curia judges have been given the option to move over to
the administrative law courts. However, notable factors weigh against exercising
this option. First, Curia administrative law judges will be likely face a status
degrade when moving over to the new courts. Due to both the sheer number, as well
as the political nature of the appointments, former-Curia judges will likely be
treated as outsiders to the new system. Altogether, the Curia only has 83 justices,
including its President and Vice-President.39 Twenty serve as administrative law
judges, and eleven work in the labor section.40 Even if all the administrative and
labor court judges were to move to the new administrative law courts, that would
still only constitute 31 out of 300 of the judges, about 10% of the courts.
Further, Judge Kovas expressed concern over the distribution of Curia judges
were they to move to the new administrative court system. As currently designed,
the new administrative courts will hear cases in panels, with a selected number of
judges consistently sitting on a panel together to hear cases. According to Judge
Kovas, judges are uncertain what the method or constitution of panel selection will
be. For example, it is possible that the Minister of Justice and other political
appointees may constitute the panels so as to distribute the Curia-judges and other
judges with experience widely. This would have the negative effect of diluting the
expertise and independent decisions of these judges, whom we might consider to be
more trustworthy. Diluting their experience may also result in a dilution of the
This information came from the personal meeting of the Hungary IIP group with the judge, as
facilitated by his assistant and translator.
39 Organigram of the Curia, Curia of Hungary, https://kuria-birosag.hu/en/english/organigram-curia
40 Judges, Curia of Hungary, https://kuria-birosag.hu/en/english/judges
38
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independent check on executive power or political influence which is a concern with
judges that will be appointed by the Minister of Justice.
On the other hand, distributing these judges across different panels may also
benefit the new court system by disseminating their expertise and knowledge.
However, in Judge Kovas’s mind, having no control over whom he would work with
is a serious downside of transferring to the new court system because it potentially
compromises his independent decision-making function. Sitting on a panel with
other judges who may vote contrary to him may essentially nullify his decisions,
and those of other experienced judges’. This is a serious concern with judicial
independence as well as accuracy and expertise.
Judge Kovas also expressed concern with the expertise and knowledge aspect
of the new administrative law courts. He seemed to believe that the new appointees
would likely be civil servants, with no judicial experience whatsoever, resulting in
an extensive court system adjudicating important cases with very little practical
understanding of how to adjudicate the cases. Judge Kovas acknowledged that there
may be some benefit to former-Curia or other judges in this respect—new
appointees may be looking to the experienced judges for advice and guidance as
they navigate new terrain. This may counteract the fear of status relegation which
might accompany judges who move from the Curia to the new administrative law
courts. Which way this power imbalance ultimately tips will remain to be seen.
Administrative law judges at the Curia will be forced to choose between
moving to the new courts, or resigning from their current positions as
11

administrative law judges. If they choose not to move, they will either retire,
transition into another legal field (such as private practice), or learn a new field of
law and remain a Curia judge. For some judges, the choice to remain at the Curia is
tempting—however, the challenge of having to transition into the civil or criminal
law departments is daunting, especially in a legal regime where being an
administrative law judge may be the only profession these judges have ever known.
Learning a new area of law and developing expertise in a new area of law seems an
almost insurmountable task. Realistically, then, the choice appears to be between
moving to the new administrative law courts, or moving out of a judicial role.
VI. The Venice Commission’s March 2019 Opinion
On March 19, 2019, the European Commission for Democracy Through Law
(Venice Commission) issued its opinion on Hungary’s proposed laws on
administrative courts.41 In its report, it raised concerns over the broad powers
reserved for the Minister of Justice to set up and shape the administrative court
system, the broad powers conferred on the President of the future Supreme Court
and future heads of court.42 However, the Commission nevertheless issued
commendation for the proposed measures of the law as well. In particular, the
opinion praised the fact that all current administrative judges would be permitted
to transfer to the new administrative court system if they wished, and that the

41Hungary

Opinion On the Law on Administrative Courts and On the Law On the Entry into Force
of the Law on Administrative Courts and Certain Transitional Rules, European Commission for
Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission), March 19, 2019,
https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD(2019)004-e
42 Id. at 25.
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courts would be opened to “individuals with substantial experience of working in
public administration”—in other words, to current public officials in the
administration.43
Of interest, the report reported certain positive points about the law which
are concerning. First, it noted that there was no reason to oppose the “sovereign
decision of the Hungarian legislature” to create a new administrative court
system.44 In support of this contention, the Commission declared that the “principle
of creating a new separate legal order in the area of administrative law” is fully
within the “sovereign right” of the national legislature, and completely in line with
European standards.45 The Commission further acknowledged that having
administrative judges from “more diverse professional backgrounds” was “a positive
point.”46 What is more, it stated that the possibility of appointing individuals who
had worked in the administration or as an administrative court judge was a
“guarantee of effectiveness.”47
Thus, the Venice Commission, while stating general concerns with the law,
simultaneously affirmed the overall scheme to create a distinct body of courts. This
is in spite of one of the biggest criticisms of the new administrative court system,
that is, its lacking of judicial independence. While the Commission observed that a

Id.
Id. at 7.
45 Id. at 24.
46 Id. at 8.
47 Hungary Opinion On the Law on Administrative Courts and On the Law On the Entry into Force
of the Law on Administrative Courts and Certain Transitional Rules, European Commission for
Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission), March 19, 2019, at 8,
https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD(2019)004-e
43
44
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major drawback of the plan is that “extensive power” is concentrated in the hands of
few stakeholders and there are “no effective checks and balances” to counter those
powers, it nevertheless concedes that Hungary’s proposal can fully comply with
European requirements if it made recommended adjustments.48
To conclude the report, the Commission made five specific recommendations.
First, to amend the recruitment procedure for judges, providing criteria for the
Minister to change candidates rankings established by the personnel council of the
National Administrative Judicial Council (NAJC), require council’s consent for any
change, and “at the very least” provide a judicial remedy enabling candidates to
challenge the Minister’s decision.49 Second, to “examine the possibility of”
strengthening the judges part of the NAJC council. Third, to amend the procedure
for appointing heads of court to involve the NAJC in the Minister’s final decision.
Fourth, to provide “fairly extensive experience (of at least five years for example) of
working as a judge” for candidates nominated for the President of the Supreme
Administrative Court.50 Fifth and finally, to identify ways to counter the presidents’
powers, including those of the President of the Supreme Administrative Court by
involving judges, elected representatives, administrative judicial councils, or the
NAJC in dealing with various issues. The report concludes noting that if the draft
amendments were adopted, some of the Commission’s criticism would be “moot.”51

Id. at 25.
Id.
50 Id. at 26.
51 Id.
48
49
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While the Commission’s 26-page opinion goes to lengths to analyze the
provisions of the law and its shortcomings, it nevertheless affirms the legitimacy
and validity of the Hungarian legislature’s clear attempt to usurp judicial
independence. The Venice Commission’s failure to contextualize the act in light of
the Fidesz party’s long-term plan to skirt constitutional limits is a serious problem.
Rather than viewing the Act as another move to erode checks against the Fidesz
party’s agenda, the Commission takes a middle ground, appearing neutral but
ultimately handing down an opinion that is naively hopeful at best, and
irresponsibly enabling at worst.
The Hungarian government had pledged to amend its law in the ways
recommended by the Venice Commission, although it failed to do so at the
beginning of April.52 As mentioned earlier, it complied only with about 30% of the
Venice Commission’s recommendations, proving that faith in the Hungarian
government was ill-placed. The Commission’s condonement of Hungary’s attempt to
create this system without acknowledging the problematic context in which it arises
bears negatively on the Commission’s responsibility to call out threats to
constitutional democracy when it rears its ugly head. In spite of the careful, rule-oflaw analysis that deems that the new legal order “cannot a priori be called into

52

See supra note 30.
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question,” the Commission’s gentle approach toward Hungary ultimately proved a
naïve and ineffective move.53
VII. Conclusion
This paper has presented the recent developments with respect to Hungary’s
new administrative courts law set to go into effect January 2020. The events
surrounding and leading up to the passage of the law have been mired in party
politics and insinuations of democratic erosion. While the context of the law
provides much reason to fear the takeover of the judiciary’s independence, there is
possibly hope that Hungary will take the Commission’s recommendations. Doing so
would provide some safeguards against the unchecked powers of the new President
of the Supreme Administrative Court, as well as the Minster of Justice. Only time
will tell whether the Commission’s overall sanction of the program, rather than
outright condemnation, will pave the way for greater democratic backsliding.

53

Venice Commission, supra note 41, 7.
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